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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
In United States v. Pepper, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 
1229 (2011), the Supreme Court held that, once the original 
sentence is set aside on appeal,  a district court could 
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consider postsentencing rehabilitation in determining an 
appropriate sentence on remand, unless the court ordering 
the remand explicitly precludes consideration of such 
evidence. 
 
Here, we vacated Salinas-Cortez‟s original sentence 
because the district court did not address his request for a 
“minor role adjustment,” and we remanded for the district 
court to consider that claim in calculating the applicable 
range under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. During the 
sentencing hearing that followed, Salinas-Cortez also asked 
the district court to consider the efforts he had made toward 
rehabilitation since he was sentenced. The district court 
refused to do so because the court believed that its authority 
on remand was limited to addressing the request for a minor 
role adjustment.  After rejecting Salinas-Cortez‟s request to 
consider his postsentencing rehabilitation, the court 
reimposed the original sentence. 
 
Approximately one week later, the Supreme Court 
decided Pepper.  We are now asked to decide if the district 
court erred in rejecting evidence of postsentencing 
rehabilitation as permitted in Pepper.  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that the district court did err and we will 
therefore vacate the sentence once again and remand for 
resentencing. 
I. 
 
The district court initially sentenced Salinas-Cortez 
after accepting his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to 
possess more than five kilograms of cocaine with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count of 
possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent 
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(a) 
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting). 
 
At that sentencing, Salinas-Cortez requested a 
sentence reduction of four levels (or in the alternative, two 
levels) pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  The request was 
based on his claim that he was a minimal and/or minor 
participant in the distribution conspiracy, that he did not 
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have a decision-making role, and was not entitled to a 
significant portion of the proceeds from the drug sales.
1
 
 
The Presentence Report concluded that Salinas-
Cortez had been more than a minimal or minor participant 
and that he was therefore not entitled to any reduction under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.  The district court adopted the 
Presentence Report, but did not expressly rule on Salinas-
Cortez‟s request for a reduction as a minor participant.  The 
court then imposed a sentence of 156 months of 
incarceration, and Salinas-Cortez appealed. 
 
As we noted at the outset, on appeal, Salinas-Cortez 
argued that the district court had committed procedural error 
by not expressly ruling on his colorable request for a two-
level reduction.  We agreed and vacated the sentence.  In 
doing so, we reaffirmed that a sentencing judge is free to 
adopt the proposed findings in a Presentence Report.  See 
United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).  
However, we were concerned that  “the record [did] not 
clearly establish that the District Court [independently] 
decided the two-level issue and intended the presentence 
report to serve as an explanation of [the court's] ruling on 
that issue[.]”  
 
Salinas-Cortez does not now challenge the district 
court‟s rejection of his request for a reduction for being a 
minor participant.  Rather, his sole argument here is that the 
district court erred in refusing to consider any evidence of 
his postsentencing rehabilitation on remand as permitted by 
Pepper. 
                                                 
1
 See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) and (b) (A defendant is 
a “minimal participant” entitled to a four-level 
reduction in sentencing if he is plainly among the 
least culpable of those involved in the conduct 
because he lacked sufficient knowledge or 
understanding of the scope and structure of the 
criminal enterprise.  Alternatively, a defendant is a 
“minor participant” entitled to a two-level 
reduction in sentencing if he is less culpable than 
most other participants but he can not be 
considered a “minimal participant” in the criminal 
enterprise.). 
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II. 
 
In Pepper, Jason Pepper pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §846.  131 S. Ct. at 1236.  The 
district court sentenced him to a 24-month prison term, 
which was approximately a 75 percent downward departure 
from the low end of the Guidelines range.
2
  Id.  The 
Government appealed the sentence and the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for 
resentencing pursuant to United  States. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005).  Id.  However, Pepper served his sentence and 
had been released prior to resentencing.  Id.   
 
At the subsequent resentencing hearing, Pepper 
presented substantial evidence of postsentencing 
rehabilitation, and the district court then reimposed the 
original sentence of 24 months of imprisonment based on its 
conclusion that no federal sentencing policy would be 
advanced by returning Pepper to prison.  Id. at 1237. 
 
The Government again appealed arguing that the 
sentence was too lenient, and the Court of Appeals again 
reversed after concluding that the district court erred in 
considering Pepper‟s postsentencing rehabilitation on 
remand. Id.
3
  Pepper appealed, and the Supreme Court 
                                                 
2
 “Pepper's sentencing range under the Guidelines was 
97 to 121 months.  The Government moved for a 
downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1 based 
on Pepper's substantial assistance and recommended a 
15 percent downward departure.”  See Pepper, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1236. 
3
 The Supreme Court explained: “the Court of 
Appeals rejected Pepper's argument that the District 
Court erred in refusing to consider his postsentencing 
rehabilitation. The court acknowledged that Pepper 
made significant progress during and following his 
initial period of imprisonment and commended 
Pepper on the positive changes he has made in his 
life, but concluded that Pepper's argument was 
foreclosed by Circuit precedent [precluding reliance 
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granted certiorari to decide two questions. The Court 
defined the first of the two issues as: “whether a district 
court, after a defendant's sentence has been set aside on 
appeal, may consider evidence of a defendant's 
postsentencing rehabilitation to support a downward 
variance when resentencing the defendant.”  Id. at 1239. 
 
In resolving that issue, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that it “has long recognized that” “the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant‟s life and 
characteristics” “is „highly relevant – if not essential – to the 
selection of an appropriate sentence.‟”  Id. at 1240 (quoting 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).  Indeed, 
as the Pepper Court explained, Congress codified this 
principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that “no 
limitation shall be placed on the [sentencing court‟s 
consideration of] information concerning the background, 
character, and conduct” of a defendant.  Id.  The Court also 
noted that § 3553(a) requires consideration of a defendant‟s 
history and characteristics.  Id. at 1242. 
 
The reason for such consideration is readily apparent.  
Appropriate sentences can only be imposed when sentencing 
courts “consider the widest possible breadth of information 
about a defendant.”  Id. at 1240.  It is only then that we can 
“ensure[] that the punishment will suit not merely the 
offense but the individual defendant.”  Id.   As we have 
previously explained, the now advisory Guideline range is 
but one of many factors that must be considered if a court is 
to properly impose a sentence that is tailored to the offender 
rather than one that focuses only on the offense.  See United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (When 
sentencing, “it is essential that district courts make an 
„individualized assessment based on facts presented.‟”) 
(quoting Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).   
 
                                                                                                           
upon] post-sentencing rehabilitation [as] a 
permissible factor to consider in granting a 
downward variance.”  Id. At 1239 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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It is only by ensuring that the individual 
circumstances of the defendant are not obliterated by the 
offense that an individual‟s potential to successfully rejoin 
society is maximized and the interest of public safety 
advanced.  Thus, “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the 
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider 
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a 
unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, 
sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to 
ensue.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).  
This bedrock principle predates enactment of the 
Guidelines. 
 
It should therefore not be surprising that a 
defendant‟s postsentencing rehabilitation may illuminate a 
defendant‟s character and assist the sentencing court in 
assessing who the defendant is as well as who s/he may 
become.  Such information may, in some cases, be as 
significant in ascertaining the defendant‟s character and 
likelihood of recidivism as the defendant‟s conduct before 
s/he was forced to account for his/her antisocial behavior.  
See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1242 (citing with approval United 
States v. McMannus, 496 F.3d 846, 853 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(Melloy, J., concurring) (“In assessing at least three of the 
Section 3553(a) factors, deterrence, protection of the public 
and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(B)(C) & (D), there 
would seem to be no better evidence than a defendant‟s 
post-incarceration conduct.”)).   
 
Consequently, the Court concluded that 
postsentencing rehabilitation was a critical part of a 
defendant‟s history that can be relevant in assessing the 
likelihood of future criminal behavior.  Pepper, 131 S. Ct.  
at 1242; see also, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (“A district court to 
which a case is remanded . . . shall resentence a defendant in 
accordance with section 3553.”). 
 
Nevertheless, the Court in Pepper was also careful to 
note that, where appropriate, a reviewing court retains the 
authority to limit the scope of the sentencing hearing that 
will occur on remand.  Id. at 1249 n. 17.  However, given 
the Court‟s analysis, it is clear that such a limitation is the 
exception and not the rule, and district courts should not 
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infer any such limitation on remand.  Rather, a limitation 
precluding the consideration of postsentencing rehabilitation 
must clearly appear on the face of the opinion or judgment 
vacating the original sentence and remanding for 
resentencing.  
 
In explaining our decision and ordering the remand 
here, we stated:  
 
[W]e believe there was procedural error and on remand 
the court should address Salinas–Cortez's request for a two-level 
reduction as a minor participant in the offense.  Of course, we 
express no opinion on the proper determination. . . . For the 
foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction, 
vacate the sentence and remand for the District Court to consider 
whether Salinas–Cortez was a “minor” participant under 
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). 
 
United States  v. Salinas-Cortez, 403 F. App‟x. 686, 689 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 
Despite the Government‟s argument to the contrary, 
this rather generic language is simply not sufficient to limit 
the district court‟s ability to consider evidence of 
postsentencing rehabilitation in fashioning an appropriate 
sentence on remand.  Accordingly, we will once again 
vacate the sentence that was imposed and remand for 
resentencing.  
 
 
